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I shall talk about an area of the law of great significance to 
any society’s measure of justice, criminal sentencing. I call 
my remarks “Weinstein on Sentencing.”
Has Judge Weinstein over the course of decades fun-
damentally changed the contours of law and practice in 
this area? I think he would say “not enough.” But that’s 
not for lack of trying. In addition to many law review arti-
cles and speeches, he has written scores of sentencing 
opinions that exceed the standards of the most exacting 
academic—thorough, analytically impregnable, and heav-
ily footnoted—attempting to get the Second Circuit, the 
Supreme Court, and Congress to remake sentencing law.
He has not waged these battles alone—but more than 
any judge I can think of, he has waged them continually 
and on every front, with powerful intelligence and human-
ity. In these ways he is one of the creators of today’s new 
sentencing landscape, in which judges are allowed to con-
sider not just what the Sentencing Commission proclaims, 
but what justice requires.
Never content to rest on his laurels, Judge Weinstein 
has, in the years since United States v. Booker1 and its 
progeny, turned his sights primarily on the Guidelines’ 
tough cousin, mandatory minimums. And, looking to  
stir up a little controversy (for a change), he’s taken on 
sentencing in child pornography cases.
The first case to recall this evening actually involves 
neither the Guidelines nor mandatory minimums. In 
1977, Judge Weinstein had the duty to sentence Daniel 
Fatico, who had pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to 
receive stolen goods in interstate commerce, in connec-
tion with a truck hijacking at Kennedy Airport. The 
Government advised the court that, at the sentencing pro-
ceeding, it wished to call an FBI agent who would provide 
reliable, informant information that Fatico was a “made 
member” of the Gambino family. Judge Weinstein held 
that the government could not call the witness, concluding 
that this was a new allegation that was material to sentenc-
ing under the then-existing “special offender” law and, 
therefore, that such hearsay testimony would violate Fati-
co’s confrontation and due process rights.2
The Government sought mandamus in the Second 
Circuit. And, as has often been the case, it won—at least 
initially.3
At the sentencing hearing on remand, the Government 
called not one but ten witnesses. Judge Weinstein found that 
it had proved by “clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence,” 
that the defendant was indeed a member of the Gambino 
family. On this basis, he explained, he was sentencing 
Fatico much more severely than he otherwise would have.
On the defendant’s appeal, the Government requested 
the Second Circuit to reject both the burden-of-proof stan-
dard the Judge had used and “also the entire concept of a 
[sentencing] hearing.” The Court of Appeals addressed 
these matters in a footnote. It did not approve or disapprove 
of the standard of proof. And it did not require sentencing 
hearings for important disputed facts. It did, however, allow 
that “we certainly would not hold it an abuse of discretion” 
for a district judge to hold such a hearing.4
And so Fatico hearings were not instituted by the Court 
of Appeals, which had not said they were necessary. And 
they were not instituted through the Criminal Rules, nor 
by Congress or the Supreme Court. They were developed 
and instituted by Judge Weinstein. They became the prac-
tice throughout the Second Circuit and many courts 
beyond. And it is a testament to Judge Weinstein’s vision 
and persistence that the evidentiary hearings required by 
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 are called, at least in 
these parts, Fatico hearings.5
Now let me give but a glimpse of Judge Weinstein’s 
sentencing jurisprudence in the years since the Sentencing 
Guidelines went into effect.
It is not surprising that the creator of the Fatico hear-
ing was initially well disposed toward the Guidelines as a 
way to bring reason and a greater measure of process to 
sentencing.6 At the same time, he warned, “To apply the 
rules of the new system blindly amounts to injustice. . . . 
No matter how efficient it would be, we may not delegate 
the sentencing decision entirely to the computer.”7
As the radical nature of the Guidelines became clear by 
the early 1990s, Judge Weinstein soured on them. His dis-
content coalesced into four main criticisms. First, because 
they were so rigid, they had perverted the sensible idea of 
reducing disparity into “an unnecessarily cruel procrustean 
bed.” Second, while seeking to reduce inter-judge sentenc-
ing disparity, what the Guidelines actually reduced was 
inter-judge sentencing discussion, at least among the judges 
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in the Eastern District of New York. Third, the new regime 
required judges to look at the “bad” aspects of the defendant, 
while neither probation officers nor defense counsel had 
any incentive to be aggressive in seeking out the “good.”8
Fourth and foremost, the Guidelines failed to treat 
each defendant as “a unique human being.” In his 1992 
article entitled A Trial Judge’s Second Impression of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Judge Weinstein noted that 
“[i]t would be historically and morally inappropriate to 
equate [sentencing under the guidelines with] deliberate 
and atrocious war crimes and genocide.”9 Yet in the 
next sentence he quoted Hannah Arendt’s work on the 
Holocaust, and expressed his worry that under the 
Guidelines “we judges will cease to aspire to the highest 
traditions of humanity and personal responsibility that 
ought to characterize our office.”10
Judge Weinstein has never ceased to aspire to the highest 
traditions of his office. Acting within what he understands 
to be the limits of the law—which for this Judge are, 
essentially, appellate opinions directly on point and man-
dates from the Second Circuit to him!—he has sought to 
find ways, where warranted, to accord mercy under that 
law. Early on he became a judicial Houdini in freeing 
himself from various Guidelines mandates. Reading the 
Sentencing Reform Act to allow departures in areas not 
specifically contemplated by the Commission, he 
departed on the basis of physical illness,11 being a single 
parent,12 reduced mental capacity,13 insufficient evidence 
that the drug courier defendants knew that the drug in the 
balloons they’d swallowed was heroin, and many more 
grounds not addressed in the Guidelines.14 In several 
cases, he deferred sentencing for a year so the defendants 
might have an opportunity for rehabilitation.15
I get a special kick out of a case where the Second Circuit 
had earlier reversed his order granting bail. At sentencing, 
Judge Weinstein granted a departure because of, among 
other factors, “the defendant’s long pretrial incarceration 
under onerous conditions.”16 (So there, Second Circuit!)
Judge Weinstein actually got away with all of the 
decisions I’ve mentioned—but perhaps that’s because 
the Government, for one reason or another, didn’t 
appeal them.
Where it did appeal, Judge Weinstein was less  
successful.
The Second Circuit rejected, for instance, his holding in 
1994 that a close reading of the Sentencing Reform Act 
revealed that the Guidelines were not, in fact, mandatory.17 
In another case, where the Court of Appeals insisted that 
he apply a six-level increase due to relevant conduct,18 the 
Judge asked, regarding the sentence he was required to 
impose, “Under the blindfold, does justice weep?”19
As these decisions suggest, Judge Weinstein is proac-
tive. In 2003 Congress enacted the Feeney Amendment, 
which required the Courts of Appeals to review de novo 
any departure from the Sentencing Guidelines. The Judge 
responded by publishing a memorandum, in Federal 
Rules Decisions, called In Re Sentencing.20 There he 
announced that henceforth all of his sentencing hearings 
would be videotaped, in order to “assist the Court of 
Appeals judges in their new onerous task”—and, he went 
on, “the appellate judges can observe the actual people 
they are sentencing.”21
Not surprisingly, since Booker came down in 2005, 
Judge Weinstein has . . . exercised his discretion.22 For 
instance, he has refused to apply sentencing enhance-
ments where there is no proof of mens rea.23 And in an 
opinion spanning more than one hundred pages, he 
decried—even as he applied—mandatory minimums for 
minor participants in drug crimes.24
As I noted at the outset, he has also taken on the  
difficult and sensitive matter of sentencing in child por-
nography cases. In the 2008 Polizzi25 case, he had to 
sentence a pizza shop owner convicted of possessing  
this material, where the Guideline range was thirteen to 
fifteen years. In a later law review article, the Judge 
referred to the defendant as “a middle-aged, otherwise 
blameless peaceful citizen,” and family man, who viewed 
the child pornography in a locked room in his detached 
garage.26 Judge Weinstein varied the sentence from the 
Guideline range of thirteen years down to the statutory 
minimum of five years. Although the Polizzi case, like 
many, bounced several times between Cadman Plaza and 
Pearl Street, the Second Circuit ultimately allowed the 
sentence to stand—while rejecting Judge Weinstein’s 
order granting a new trial and his argument that juries 
should be informed of applicable mandatory prison terms.
In another child pornography case decided last year, 
the judge found that applying the five-year statutory mini-
mum would violate that defendant’s rights under the 
Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punish-
ment.27 This was no idle speculation; the Judge wrote a 
400-page opinion explaining the historical, doctrinal, 
and factual bases for his judgment.
That 400-page opinion, and the others like it, are, I 
think, crucial to understanding this judge. Critics and fans 
alike have sometimes made the mistake of thinking that 
Judge Weinstein wears rose-colored glasses, or that he is 
“soft” on crime, or that he’s just got this big heart that’s 
spilling over with no reason or analysis. It is true that Jack 
Weinstein is humane and empathetic, and that he has great 
social insight and compassion. He brings these qualities to 
bear in his judging. But he also brings to bear piercing 
intelligence that untangles complexity, and integrity that 
rebukes deception. He comprehends the whole of the law, 
and never fails to explain his reasoning under the law.
I would say of Jack Weinstein what he has recalled 
about great judges of the past. In a new article entitled 
The Roles of A Federal District Court Judge,28 he writes: “A 
candid statement of the reasoning supporting the trial 
court’s decision is always required. Mendacity in twist-
ing the facts, evidence, history or legal background to 
arrive at a conclusion is not acceptable.” He then quotes 
Learned Hand’s description of another New York judge: 
“[Cardozo] never disguised the difficulties, as lazy judges 
FSR2403_10.indd   215 29/02/12   10:57 AM
This content downloaded from 128.36.45.232 on Tue, 7 May 2013 10:46:04 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Federal  Sentencing  reporter  •  Vol .  24 ,  no.  3  •  February  2012216
do [,] who win the game by sweeping all the chessmen 
off the table. . . .”29
Judge Weinstein has always acknowledged all the 
chessmen—all the laws that bind him and the litigants 
who come before him.
But Judge Weinstein does play chess very well.
Notes
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 21 Id. at 262 n.20.
 22 When the Supreme court issued its landmark decision in 
Blakely v. Washington, 542 u.S. 296 (2004), Judge Weinstein 
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